Abstract. The main objects here are Nash equilibria in spatial Cournot oligopolies when pro…ts depend on coordinated distribution. Production is noncooperative, but the subsequent transportation must be performed jointly to minimize costs. Cournot-Nash equilibria for this two-stage game with partial coalitional strategies are determined by means of a mathematical-based algorithm. A numerical illustration is presented.
Introduction
This paper considers an oligopolistic industry comprising geographically separated …rms and markets. Those …rms interact at two stages. First, they produce, possibly at many locations, commodities to be delivered at several shared markets. Second, if possible, they agree on how to best distribute the goods to satisfy consumers'demand. More speci…cally, ex ante …rms decide, independently and without collaboration, how much of various commodities to produce and supply at di¤erent markets. When making these decisions, they know that all goods will …nally be transported from production sites to customers in an e¢ cient manner.
An increasing number of deregulated network industries including electricity and natural gas supply are examples where competition may occur in this way: Firms often have market power in production and sales -they produce noncooperatively -whereas product distribution is regulated to enhance e¢ ciency or mitigate monopoly e¤ects, see e.g., Newbery (1999) for an overview of competitive issues regarding network industries. For practical purposes the (regulated) coordinated activities may either be subject to contracts or outsourced to competitive agents, offering appropriately specialized services. The obvious questions is then: Will the overall two-stage game admit an equilibrium? A¢ rmative and constructive answers are already given in a recent study by Flåm and Jourani (2003) , who de…ne and characterize equilibria in games of this kind. Methods for determining an equilibrium solution in practice are, however, lacking. The purpose of the present paper is, therefore, to present a new characterization of equilibrium of the spatial oligopoly game featuring both non-cooperative and cooperative strategies and, moreover, to provide algorithms for determining an equilibrium solution. In doing so, I extend the mathematical programming approach of Murphy, Sherali and Soyster (1982) to a spatial and partial coalitional context.
The two-stage game outlined above partly belongs to regional science. The study of spatial competition was initiated by Samuelson (1952) . Harker (1986) reviews the early literature, formulates equilibria by variational inequalities, and brings out algorithms that solve the latter; see also Nagurney (1988) and Miller, Tobin and Friesz (1991) . In all these studies, however, competition is purely non-cooperative, while insisting on joint distribution, as in the present paper, requires adoption of methods from cooperative game theory.
Whether coordinated transportation is voluntary or imposed by the authorities, it had better re ‡ect e¤ort to minimize cost. The joint transportation problem will, therefore, be formalized here as a cooperative game in which the cost allocation constitutes a core solution (Gillies 1953) . Each …rm reasonably anticipates, during the production phase, that the said allocation will indeed belong to the core. More specifically, the second-stage coalitional game …ts the form of so-called production games (Owen 1975) , which belong to the large family of ‡ow games; see Kalai and Zemel (1982a&b) and Dubey and Shapley (1984) . Moreover, Owen (1975) constructively …nds a core allocation using any optimal solution of the dual linear program associated to the grand coalition. (For generalizations and extensions of production games see e.g. Granot 1986 , Sandsmark 1999 and Evstigneev and Flåm 2001 . His recipe perfectly …ts our setting.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the two-stage model, in line with the regional oligopoly model of Flåm and Jourani (2003) . Reviewed in that section are the basic concepts from cooperative game theory. In Section 3 the overall Cournot-Nash equilibrium is established and characterized. Two related algorithms for determining the equilibrium solution are presented in Section 4, along with a numerical illustration. Section 5 concludes.
The two-stage model
Throughout there is a …xed, …nite set I of …rms with production sites located at one or more origins o 2 O. (It is common, e.g., for electricity companies both small and large to own power generating units at several nodes of a transmission network.) A …rm does not, however, need to have a factory at each origin o. All …rms produce a homogenous good sold to customers distributed at various destinations d 2 D. By assumption the sets O, D are …nite and disjoint. The chief economic activities of the …rms take place over two stages: …rst comes production, second is transportation.
These are discussed next in that order. Let Q d := P i2I q id denote the total supply at destination d: Demand there is embodied in a non-increasing, di¤erentiable inverse curve P d (Q d ) that states the unit price at which local consumers will purchase the amount Q d . I posit that gross revenue
Further, production cost f io (q io ) of …rm i at origin o is taken to be convex. It is tacitly understood that f io (q io ) = +1 if q io < 0 or if q io exceeds some speci…ed capacity. Firm i's payo¤ i (q) 2 R[ f 1g from sales is then given by
It depends on own choice q i := (q io ; q id ) o2O;d2D and the output pro…le q i which is shorthand for the choices q j := (q jo ; q jd ) o2O;d2D ; j 2 Ini; made by i's rivals. The key objects here are equilibrium outcomes. Before turning to those we must describe 2.2. Second-stage cooperative distribution. For …rms to enjoy sale proceeds, the goods produced must be shipped to consumers. Assume all …rms incur transportation cost c od per unit shipped from production site o to destination d: The unit cost c i od might very well vary across …rms. For notational simplicity we shall stick to the uniform case though. Fixed cost are ignored. Transportation costs are thus proportional to the amount shipped. Further, I assume that the transportation cost matrix does not allow for the transportation paradox, c.f. Dejneko, Klinz and Woegniger (2003) .
Let x od denote the amount of goods shipped from origin o to destination d. Then the second-stage problem of …rm i would, in autarky, amount to …nding a distribution pattern x 2 R O D + that minimizes its transportation costs. This is done by solving minimize P o2O;d2D c od x od subject to P d2D x od q io ; for all o; P o2O x od q id ; for all d; and x od 0; for all o; d:
The …rst inequality of (2) implies that no …rm can ship more goods from a production site o than what it makes available there; the second equation tells that the total amount of goods it ships to destination d must meet the obligation (commitment) to serve there. Denote the minimal cost in (2) by c(q i ):
Since the products are homogeneous, customers are indi¤erent as to the origins of goods. As a result there are potential e¢ ciency gains to be had from aggregating individual transportation tasks. Upon doing so, some …rms can supply nearby customers on behalf of more remote …rms. For the argument suppose coalition S I of …rms were to coordinate their transport to customers. After pooling their supply-demand vectors to have aggregates 
Let c(q S ) denote the minimal cost in (3). Our concern is whether the overall minimal cost c(q I ) can be achieved and fairly divided. For that issue consider the cooperative transferable utility game with characteristic function S 7 ! c(q S ). This game (I; c) has orthogonal coalitions, meaning that members of S can achieve cost c(q S ) regardless of what players outside S do. That is, the only threat against S by a player i 2 InS, or any coalition of such players, is the boycott (see e.g. Shubik, 1982) . Further, a reasonable allocation u = (u i ) i2I of total costs c(q I ) should lie in the core. The inequalities imply coalitional stability: no single or group of players can do better by themselves. The equation accounts for Pareto e¢ ciency. Subadditivity is necessary for non-emptyness of the core:
This condition evidently holds in our case. Moreover, the cost sharing game is balanced, which su¢ ces for non-emptiness of the core, c.f. Bondareva (1962) and Shapley (1967) . From the analysis of production games in Owen (1975) we get forthwith Theorem 1. (Non-empty core of second-stage transportation game) Assume that for any society-wide pro…le q = (q i ) i2I decided upon during the …rst stage, the subsequent linear program (3) is feasible and has a …nite optimal value for S = I. Then (3) de…nes a cooperative transportation game which is totally balanced.
Most important, Owen (1975) constructively displayed a core allocation in terms of solutions associated with the dual to program (3) when S = I. Of course, to make that result applicable here, we must require that the optimal value c(q I ) be …nite for all strategy pro…les q = (q i ) i2I that might come into consideration. Then core elements are easily found. To wit, let := ( d ; o ) d2D;o2O be any optimal solution to the dual transportation problem:
Then we have
Consequently, distributing total costs c(q I ) by the rule
we have, for any S; X
yielding by (4) and (5), respectively, X
Thus the resulting allocation u = (u i ) i2I belongs to the core of (3). The relationship between the core of games generated from linear programming problems and the set of dual optimal solutions, is further studied in Samet and Zemel (1984) . An axiomatic characterization of the set of solutions derived in this manner is presented in Van Gellenkom et al. (2000) . To sum up, pooling supply-demand vectors q i = (q io ; q id ) o2O;d2D and solving (3) for S = I; yields an optimal distribution pattern x : By implementing this solution, …rms incur joint minimum transportation cost c(q I ), and …rm i's second-stage share of the joint transportation cost is de…ned as
When costs are shared as suggested above, each …rm pays in accordance with the transportation task it brings to the community evaluated by the optimal Lagrangian multipliers. For convenience and in anticipation of the subsequent analysis, I introduce the set (q) := fall which are dually optimal in (3) for S = Ig :
is convex and @u(q)=@q i = @u i (q i )=@q i = (q): Moreover, the correspondence q ! (q) is monotone.
Proof. The function
is convex, hence so is c(q) := inf x C(x; q): By duality we have
where @c(q) denotes the generalized subdi¤erential of convex analysis (Rockafellar, 1970) . Any such subdi¤erential is monotone. Since
is a so-called inf-convolution, it follows that @c(q I ) = @c(q i ) for all i:
3. Equilibrium for the two-stage game Assembling the two stages, let
denote …rm i's overall pro…t. It seeks to maximize i (q) with respect to own choice q i while anticipating q i : The …rst-stage pro…t i (q), that is revenues from sales minus production costs, was de…ned in (1), and the individual share of second-stage joint transportation cost u i (q) was de…ned in (6). We can now establish an equilibrium for the spatial two-stage oligopoly game.
De…nition 2. (Equilibrium)
A strategy pro…le q = ( q i ) i2I 0 constitutes a CournotNash equilibrium with partial coalitional strategies if each q i is an optimal solution to the problem maximize
Recall that by assumption the individual objective (7) is concave in q i and jointly continuous in the pro…le q: Therefore existence of equilibrium is not di¢ cult to ensure: Consider now the following characterization of equilibrium.
Theorem 3. (Characterization of equilibrium) Assume the industry revenue curve
Then a strategy pro…le q = ( q i ) i2I 0 is a CournotNash equilibrium if and only if there exists 2 ( q) such that
Proof. From Theorem 1 we know that there exists a feasible vector of dual optimal values = ( o ; d ) o2O;d2D associated with individual share of joint transportation costs (6) for any choice q = (q i ) i2I : Further, given Proposition 1 above and Lemma 1 of Murphy, Sherali and Soyster (1982) the objective function of (8) is concave. Moreover, Theorem 3 states the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this problem, which then are both necessary and su¢ cient for optimality of individual choice. Now, denote by M R id (q) …rm i's marginal revenue at destination d and by M C io (q) …rm i's marginal cost at origin c, such that
Then, from the conditions stated in Theorem 3, it follows that in equilibrium each …rm i which has all q i > 0; has marginal revenue at each d equal to marginal cost at each o.
Corollary 1.
(Characterization of equilibrium) When q = ( q i ) i2I > 0 is a CournotNash equilibrium with partial coalitional strategies it holds that
Using the results derived above, the next section provides two related methods for determining an equilibrium solution to the spatial oligopoly game with cooperative distribution.
Determining an equilibrium solution.
In order to …nd individual strategies that satisfy Theorem 3, regard all numbers Q d as constant parameters and consider the problem
subject to
(9) Murphy, Sherali and Soyster (1982) constructed the above equilibrating problem for the non-spatial case, i.e., with production and sales taking place within a singleton, and, also, without joint second-stage transportation activities. The method by which an algorithm is constructed from this problem is, however, equivalent.
The objective of (9) is concave, the constraints are linear, and, due to P
the maximization is taken over a compact convex set. Hence an optimal solution exists. Then consider the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this problem, where d and i denote the multipliers associated with the constraints of (9) for all d and i, respectively:
for all i; and i ; q i 0 for all i:
(10) These conditions are both necessary and su¢ cient for optimality. The usefulness of program (9) is now asserted in the following proposition.
0 be such that the optimal solution q = (q i ) i2I to (9) satis…es, for some 2 (q ); the Kuhn-Tucker conditions above with d = 0 for all d 2 D. Then the pro…le q = (q i ) i2I is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium with partial coalitional strategies. Conversely, let q = ( q i ) i2I be an equilibrium solution for some 2 ( q). Then the pro…le q = ( q i ) i2I solves (9) where 
Moreover, for any equilibrium solution q = ( q i ) i2I 0 there exists a …rm i for which
Determining an equilibrium pro…le by this procedure, one has to …nd an optimal vector = ( d ; o ) d2D;o2O associated with the numbers Q d , for all d 2 D; before checking whether these particular values Q d yield multipliers d equal to zero or not: Therefore, if any d 6 = 0 the corresponding Q d must be modi…ed, and, consequently, the optimal will also change.
Alternatively, regard all numbers Q d as constant parameters and recall that shipment along the route o ! d induces unit cost c od : Then consider another auxiliary program
Id for all d; and q i ; x od 0 for all i; o; d:
This yields a similar, but more tractable procedure.
Proposition 3. Let Q d 0 be such that the optimal solution q = (q i ) i2I to (11) yields multipliers d = 0 associated with
Then the pro…le q = (q i ) i2I is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium with partial coalitional strategies. Conversely, let q = ( q i ) i2I 0 be an equilibrium solution. Then the pro…le q = ( q i ) i2I solves (11) where This problem is equivalent to (3), for which c(q I ) is the optimal value function. Inserting c(q I ) for cx in (11), the problem becomes one of maximizing with respect to q only: Now recall that c(q I ) = u(q) and @u(q)=@q i = (q) 3
(De…nition 1 and Proposition 1). Thus the Kuhn-Tucker conditions corresponding to the reduced problem are the same as for program (9) . Then invoke Proposition 2.
In contrast to the previous procedure, one need not compute the optimal corresponding to each adjusted value Q d when searching for those values that yield multipliers d equal to zero. The appropriate at each adjustment stage will here be solved for implicitly. The equilibrium individual supply levels q i = (q id ) d2D , satisfying either (9) and (11) As we can see, …rms 1 and 3 increase their pro…ts under cooperative distribution, whereas …rm 2 is better o¤ in the non-cooperative case.
Conclusion
The object of this paper was to analyze a spatial Cournot industry where the subsequent distribution of goods to consumers was arranged via the grand coalition, implying a two-stage game with both non-cooperative and cooperative strategies. An equilibrium for the overall game was established and characterized, and methods for determining an equilibrium solution provided. Furthermore, a numerical illustration highlights an interesting consequence of joint distribution in this context: Although transportation activities were competitive already at the outset (in autarky), i.e., by means of being exogenously priced, agreeing to distribute goods jointly increases total industry output and, consequently, lowers the market price for the good. For authorities eager to increase welfare by introducing competition in network economies, it may be worth noting that appropriately designed regulation schemes may improve welfare beyond the scope of the invisible hand.
An alternative approach could be to analyze the overall game as a cooperative game, as did Sherali and Rajan (1986) for the oligopolistic (one-stage), non-spatial case. Then core solutions are not guaranteed. Moreover, the game would neither be one of orthogonal coalitions. Consequently, one should seek solutions in the orcore (see Shubik 1982) . Anyway, when the parameters of demand and cost functions are such that overall individual pro…t increases, one would expect that …rms have incentives to establish the grand coalition. Under which conditions this will happen is left for a subsequent paper.
